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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to examine empirically the impact of good corporate 
governance on financial performance of United Kingdom non-financial listed firms. 
Agency theory and stewardship theory serve as the bases of a conceptual model.  Five 
corporate governance mechanisms are examined on two financial performance indicators, 
return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q, employing cross-sectional regression methodology.  
The conclusion drawn from empirical test so performed on 252 firms listed on London 
Stock Exchange for the year 2014 indicates a positive or a negative relationship, but also 
sometimes no effect, of corporate governance mechanisms impact on financial 
performance. The implications are discussed. 
Thereby, so distinguishing effects due to causes, we present a proof that, when the right 
corporate governance mechanisms are chosen, the finances of a firm can be improved. The 
results of this research should have some implication on academia and policy makers 
thoughts. 
Keywords:  corporate governance; financial performance; United Kingdom listed firms; 
Tobin’s Q; return on assets 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of “good” corporate governance on financial 
performance of firms in the United Kingdom.  Turnbull (1997) defines corporate governance 
as all the influences affecting the institutional process, including those pointing to the 
controllers and/or regulators, involved in organising the production, sale of goods and 
services.  According to Ehikioya (2009), corporate governance is concerned with processes 
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and structures through which members interested in the firm take active measure to protect 
stakeholders’ interest. 
Corporate governance has become more relevant in contemporary times as companies grow 
and expand both in developed and emerging economies (Freeman, 1983, 2010). As 
companies expand, they use local raw materials, employ local workforce, sell to the 
community, pay taxes, etc., that supposedly benefit the community.  In addition, recent 
corporation scandals have been blamed mainly on “bad” corporate governance. (It is almost a 
daily occurrence to hear news upon scandals ruining corporations.)  Consequences of firms’ 
failure are huge; they can be felt in every aspect of society. For instance investors’ capital can 
be wiped out overnight, job losses can occur, etc. (Mallin, 2016). 
 There is another side to the story: interest groups known as stakeholders’ activities can also 
affect the corporation.  For instance, if some society is discontent with the operations of the 
corporation, it may react negatively towards the firm.  Thus, one can boycott its products. As 
a result, companies may modify their “usual governance”, now focusing on social friendly 
issues departing from idea of shareholders primacy, - when activities are mainly geared 
toward maximising shareholders aims (Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2016). In addition, there is 
some evidence to suggest that investors are willing to pay high premium for shares of firms 
perceived to have a good corporate governance structure (Clarke, 2007). This affirms why 
corporate governance mechanisms can be considered related to the financial performance of 
firms. 
 Over the past decades, there have been many academic researchers investigating links 
between corporate governance and firm financial performance.  Most of these academic 
researches point out that good corporate governance has a positive impact on firm’s financial 
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performance (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2002); however, other researchers have a different 
view (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ehikioya, 2009).   
Firms require investors’ funding to undertake expansion projects. There is evidence to 
suggest that corporations that improve good corporate governance mechanisms are able to 
increase the firm’s value by 10% to 12% (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2002).  The argument is 
that, before investors think of investing in corporation, they take into consideration the firm 
corporate governance mechanisms. According to Weir (1997), a firm for which corporate 
governance structure is seen as “undesirable” has to struggle to get loans, for example. Mallin 
(2016) points out that before investors commit their funds to investment activity, they 
consider indicators like insider shareholder, audit committees, board independence, 
board size, CEO duality, etc., all related to the corporate structure of the firm. In 
response, firms are now begun to design programmes of good corporate governance that 
would be attractive to providers of funds.  
Yet, according to Cadbury (2000), corporate governance difficulty arises because of 
separation between shareholders of the business and its control in response to a system by 
which corporations are directed and controlled. Sometimes, an agent (manager) may have 
some opposing interest to that of the principal (shareholder) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The 
problem of conflict of interest can occur as a result of asymmetric information resulting from 
imperfect contractual agreement between managers and shareholders.  Such an information 
can serve as an incentive to managers to pursue self beneficial business projects at the 
detriment of shareholders.  In addition, the board of directors may find that their business 
interests collide with their fiduciary duties.   
One role of corporate governance is to manage these conflicts between the principals and the 
agents. Good corporate governance, therefore, should have strong internal mechanisms to 
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manage various interest groups, whence to reduce high agency cost; this was of course 
discussed already along time ago by Rose-Ackerman (1973) or by Fama (1980). 
In the post–Enron financial turmoil in Asia and WorldCom in USA, there was a shift of 
corporate governance focus from its traditional grounds of agency conflicts to ethical issues 
such as accountability, transparency, disclosure, and reporting. The public demand for 
corporate accountability, following the high profile corporate scandals stimulated policy 
makers, academics, and public/private sectors to strengthen the effort of good corporate 
governance in corporations (Mallin, 2016).  According to Aguilera (2005), the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 for instance was enacted in USA in light of institutional contingencies to 
ensure that boards of directors adhere to best practices of corporate governance guidelines 
such as disclosure and honest reporting in corporations.  Good corporate governance is to be 
centred on core principles of accountability, transparency, fairness and responsible 
management. 
Addressing these concerns through business decision-making process has not only benefited 
investors, but also employees, consumers, and communities by strengthening their voices at 
general assembly meetings (Gill, 2008).  
However, the recent financial crises in 2008 has reinvigorated the debate again 
as to whether good corporate governance (positively or negatively) influences 
firms financial performance at all. To help provide unbiased judgement into 
good corporate governance and the impact on firms’ performance, we will 
research corporate governance mechanisms in UK firms.  A random sample of 
UK firms listed on London stock exchange for 2014 will be selected, thereby 
avoiding sectorial bias. 
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A complete theoretical framework based on agency and stewardship theories 
will aid in answering the research question (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
Corporate governance mechanisms such as insider shareholder, board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, and Audit committee meetings will be used in 
the study.  This is in line with studies by Ehikioya (2009) and Christensen et al. 
(2010).  Financial and market performance of the firm will be here captured 
using following proxies, respectively: (i) Return on assets (ROA); (ii) Tobin’s 
Q  (Perfect and Wiles, 1994; Tejersen et al., 2016).  These variables will be 
controlled using firm’s size and leverage. We will test a random sampling of 
252 firms listed on London Stock Exchange, different from other prior studies 
in which the sample is mostly picked-up from FTSE100 companies. 
Our report is structured as follows: here below, Section 2 contains some 
literature review.   Section 3 outlines the methodology indicating hypotheses 
and a description of the variables.  Section 4 contains the description of the 
quantitative results so obtained with a statistical significance discussion.  
Section 5 translates such findings into practical considerations, examining all 
variables. The final section (6) is reserved for concluding remarks and 
recommendation about future research directions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theoretical Background  
It has been recalled that a difficulty for nowadays implementing some “good” 
corporate governance resides in the possibly conflictual relationship between 
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the shareholders and the board of directors. This has been addressed by both 
agency theory and stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
2.1.1. Agency Theory 
The agency theory details the relationship between the managers (agents) and 
the shareholders (principals) (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  It seeks to resolve 
divergent interests between management of the organisation and the owners, 
prescribing ways of resolving such conflicts, like delegating a decision-making 
authority to the agents who manage a project.   
Along the agency theory, corporations stand a chance to increase financial 
performance if cost is minimized. The agency cost can be seen as a value loss 
by shareholders because of divergence in interests of managers and owners 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In addition, agency costs are captured in the stock 
market that affects the company’s share prices.  Therefore if agency cost is 
properly managed, it can help for improving shares value, that is, it improves 
the overall financial performance of the firm.  According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), agency costs is measured as the sum of monitoring costs, 
bonding costs and residual costs. Therefore, in order to reduce the agency cost 
the corporate governance mechanism should unravel causes of these conflicts, 
whence the need for grasping the “agency theory”. The effective corporate 
governance mechanisms control should encourage managers to act in the best 
interest of the principal (Allen and Gale, 2001).  
There is an assumption in the agency theory that, where there is a well-
developed market, corporate controls are absent.  The consequences lead to 
market failures, non-existence of the markets, moral hazards, asymmetric 
8	
	
information, incomplete contract and moral selection. Various studies however, 
have suggested that proper monitoring, healthy market competitions, control of 
executive pay, prudent debt sourcing, efficient board of directors, markets for 
corporate control and concentrated holdings can help resolving the agency 
problem (Bonazzi and Islam, 2007). The supporters of agency theory argue that, 
the role of CEO and chairperson should be assigned to separate individuals. 
This will ensure proper check and balances between CEO and the chair person 
(Gillan, 2006). 
 
2.1.2. Stewardship Theory 
Unlike the agency theory that suggests that the role of CEO and chairperson 
should be separated, the stewardship theory argues that both roles should be 
combined.  The stewardship theory suggests that directors are able to achieve 
organisational objective of shareholders by maximising their utility rather than 
self-serving. Some available empirical evidence supports the side of this 
argument of stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
Moreover, stewardship theory predicts that allowing managers to work with 
discretion can encourage them to work better. Scholars on this side of the 
debate concur that managerial behaviour is not only driven by financial reward 
but also requires discretion to enable them to maximise the shareholders’ value.  
In addition, stewardship theory stresses that the concern of managers for their 
reputation and their career intended progression compel them to act in the 
interest of shareholders; therefore, agency cost will be minimized (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991).  There is a psychological side of the argument that managers 
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are able to give up their best when they have job satisfy.  Clarke (2004) points 
that allowing managers to take decisions on their own without having to go 
through bureaucratic processes improve job satisfaction that contributes towards 
the overall financial performance of the firm. 
Besides, Fama and Jensen (1983) agued that managers have greater access to 
specific insider information, about the going concern of the organisation, than 
independent directors. Therefore, managers are expected to have acute 
knowledge of the operations of the company that will help them make well 
informed decisions. In that line of thought, the stewardship theory suggests that 
a low number of independent directors is ideal for companies (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Christensen et al.,  2010). In addition, the stweardship theory 
affirms that insider-dominated board of directors is more effective in achieving 
the organisational objective because of finer accessibility to information and 
technology. Finally, the stewardship theory maintains that the CEO essentially 
wants to work well rather than opportunistically exploits the system, - as also 
suggested by the agency theory (Donaldson, 1990). 
 
2.2. Empirical Framework 
2.2.1. Insider Shareholder 
Insider shareholder is a term used to describe a director or senior officer of a 
corporation who owns some shares of a corporation, - usually more than 10% of 
the voting shares (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), the size of the shareholding by the insider has effects on the 
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general financial performance of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) observed 
that a rise in insider shareholding by insiders does reduce the agency cost.  The 
logic behind this finding was that managers who own significant shares of the 
company would not invest in destructive or excessive high-risk projects.  
Therefore, by principle, managers will prudently invest in projects that are 
likely to reap high returns. 
Several studies show indeed that increasing the proportion of insider 
shareholding beyond an optimal point reduces financial performance.  For 
instance, Fama and Jensen (1983) point that such an increase can result in 
managerial entrenchment. Recently, Gupta and Sachdeva (2017) tested a 
comprehensive data set of hedge funds on financial performance of firms with 
much or little insider shareholding, - using multiple linear regression models. It 
is found that firms with insider investment perform better than others. The 
findings also support the view that increases in insider shareholding, up to an 
optimal point, about 20% of shares, (could) increase returns.    
McConnell and Servaes (1990) had also found that an increase in insider 
shareholder increases the firm’s performance, but beyond 40% to 50% a decline  
in firm’s performance occurs.  Yet, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) reported that, 
insider shareholder predictive effects disappear when additional corporate 
governance mechanisms are included - in a single ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression.  
2.2.2. Board Size 
The theories of economics show that the board of directors plays an important 
role in the corporate governance structure of corporations (Fama and Jensen, 
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1983).  The concern of shareholders has to do with whether the board of director 
is capable to monitor/control managers to act in the interest of the owners.  The 
general notion is that companies that have a large board size are likely to have 
effective supervision that can improve firm performance.  Anderson et al. 
(2004) and Williams et al. (2005) argued that a large board is likely to possess 
specialised skills prerequisite for efficient toward better performance. Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) also obtained a positive relationship between board size and 
financial performance.  
Another hypothesis about a small board size inducing a better performance has 
been presented by researchers arguing that limiting a board size rather improves 
communication and decision-making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996; Christensen et al., 2010; Akshita and Sharma, 2015). Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) suggested that a board member number should not exceed 10. 
Yermack (1996) discovered an inverse association between board size and 
market valuation measured by Tobin’s Q. In this respect, Akshita and Sharma 
(2015) discovered an interesting finding that a large number of board directors 
is considered to be an expensive affair for a firm, thus affecting firm’s 
performance. 
 
2.2.3. Board Independence 
Both agency theory and stewardship theory predict different outcomes 
depending on the board composition.   
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According to the agency theory, the board of directors can monitor effectively if 
these are independent from the management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Beasley, 
1996; Christensen et al., 2010). The argument is that incentives exist for outside 
directors to protect their reputation that motivate them to exercise decisional 
control (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Christensen et al., 2010).  Beasley (1996) 
argues that where there are non-executive directors on the board financial 
statement fraud is unlikely to occur.   
Yekini et al. (2015), employing content analysis and panel data set from UK 
FTSE350 companies, discovered a significant relationship between board 
independent and information disclosure measured by the proportion of non-
executive directors.  Their research shows that firms with non-executive 
directors are more likely than others to disclose information which can improve 
company performance. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) argued that the proportion 
of independent directors has a positive impact on company’s share price and 
financial performance. Both Yekini et al. (2015) and Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) support the view of agency theory that non-executive directors can 
improve company performance because of ability to monitor managers. 
In contrast, the stewardship theory argues that inside directors have in-depth 
knowledge of the company which makes them aware of valuable resources that 
improve firm performance (Donaldson, 1990). 
Other scholars argue in support of stewardship theory that, inside directors are 
trustworthy stewards of firms’ resources and improve company performance 
because of information asymmetry (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2007). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Klein (1998) discovered a 
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significant negative association between the number of independent directors 
and performance of firms.  
 
2.2.4. CEO duality 
In some companies, a CEO may have two functions; he serves as chairperson of 
the board of directors and as executive manager (Elsayed, 2007). Corporate 
governance guidelines presume that when a CEO is also the chairperson of the 
board, this leads to concentration of power (ASX, 2007).  The primary concern 
of CEO duality is that, managerial domination of the board of directors can lead 
to dubious control of meeting’s agenda (Firstenberg and Malkiel, 1994).  In this 
regard, CEO/chair may decide to send information that serves personal interest 
only to the board of directors.  Consequently, in corporations where there is a 
lack of strong monitoring of corporate governance mechanism, management can 
rather pursue their self-interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
According to Lorsch and MacIver (1989), the duality of CEO is a hindrance to 
board independence, thereby making oversight governance mechanism 
ineffective.  Other studies have discovered some improved company 
performance when the roles of CEO and the chairperson are separated.  Rechner 
and Dalton (1991) documented that firms opting for independent leadership 
consistently outperformed those relying upon dual CEO, after testing 141 US 
firms between 1978 and 1983 adopting longitudinal analysis.  Balatbat et al. 
(2004) examining 313 Australian firms between 1976 to 1983 using multiple 
linear regression analysis discovered similar result: firms with duality of CEO 
perform worse than others having no such a duality.  
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In contrast, the supporters of stewardship theory maintain that duality of 
CEO/chairperson should rather lead to superior firm performance. Stoeberl and 
Sherony (1985) argue that duality of CEO allows clear-cut leadership direction 
for strategy formulation and implementation, that is good for business. In 
addition, other scholars have said that because powers reside in one person 
uncertainty with regards to the identity of the person taking responsibility of 
decision is reduced (Christensen, et al., 2010).  Therefore, companies can 
achieve superior performance when there is duality of CEO. Cannella and 
Lubatkin (1993) documented a positive association between CEO duality and 
ROE. Boyd (1995) and Essen et al. (2013) came out with same conclusion.  
 
2.2.5. Audit committees 
The role of the audit committee is to ensure that the integrity financial reporting 
of the corporation meets corporate governance council standard.  It also ensures 
compliance of entities such as mandatory disclosures (Davidson et al., 2005)   
Kent and Stewart (2008) discovered that the quantity of disclosure was 
positively related to frequency of board and audit committee meetings held.   
However, there is some conflicting evidence from other scholars work.  Klein 
(1998) discovered that the presence of audit committees do not have any effect 
on the quality of accounting performance measures.  Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) also find no evidence to support that a relationship exists between 
performance and the “board structure (director affiliation and ownership, chairman 
affiliation, and committee composition)”. 
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2.3. Overview of previous studies relevant to UK 
Concerning corporate governance mechanisms on UK’s corporation, there are 
mixed results.  Guest (2009) indicated that board size has a strong negative 
impact on profitability, Tobin’s Q, and share returns.  According to Guest 
(2009), UK boards play a weak monitoring role; therefore any influence of large 
board size is likely to reflect the malfunction of the advisory board.  In short, 
Guest’s study supports the argument that a large board size is a hindrance to 
good communication and effective decision making.  
Florackis (2005) discovers the existence of “non-linear impact of managerial 
ownership and managerial compensation on company performance”.  He finds a 
strong evidence that managerial ownership and managerial compensation can 
work as alternative mechanisms in mitigating agency costs and, therefore, 
generating good financial performance.  
Weir et al. (2002) analyzed “the relationship between internal and external 
corporate governance mechanism on performance of UK firms within the 
context of Cadbury Committee’s  Code of Best Practice”. They discovered a 
“weak relationship” and documented that there is no evidence to support that 
“firms on top or bottom performance deciles have different corporate 
governance characteristics”. Weir et al. (2002) also raised an argument that it 
will not be right to impose a corporate governance mechanism on a firm given 
that market for corporate control is known to be a set of effective means for 
reducing the agency cost. The Weir et al. (2002) work supports the view that 
CEO shareholding can cause entrenchment resulting in poor firm performance. 
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Mura (2007) also documented a weak relationship between non-executive 
director shareholding and firm performance. But, he discovered that, the size of 
independent directors have a positive impact on firm performance. 
Recently, Al-Najjar (2017) discovered that board size and board independence 
have a significant impact on the pay of CEO and firm performance for  several 
UK firms. 
2.4. “Conclusion” 
This section 2 covers the pertinent literature of scholars who have done research  
about corporate governance. However, after reviewing empirical studies in 
various countries across different years and with different methods, we have to 
admit that one finds mixed conclusions; there are many disagreements among 
scholars. Given the expected relevance of good corporate governance, it seems 
necessary to conduct a further study, if not to clearly unravel the controversies, 
at least to establish what relationship exists between good corporate governance 
and the financial performance, for not fully studied specific firms, especially 
after the recent financial crisis. In order to do so, we consider a sample of firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange, examining insider shareholding, board 
size, board independence, duality of CEO, and audit committees effect on 
financial performance, variables which appear to be the most crucial ones.  
 
3. Methodology 
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In this section, we illustrate the statistical analysis of empirical data for the 
variables and their indicator involved in this study. We use multiple regression 
models with research hypotheses.   
 
3.1. Timeframe and Statistical Analysis Model 
A sample of firms listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the year 2014 is 
analysed here below (LSE, 2014)1. We have chosen 2014 because the year 
contains much financial information prerequisite for a robust study. 
Unfortunately many pertinent data were not documented by companies for the 
years 2015 and 2016. The periods prior to 2014 have seen a recovering stage for 
businesses after the recent financial crisis in 2007-2008. This is consistent with 
prior literature selection of firms, but further interesting due to unique financial 
characteristics for those years. In accordance with the relevant literature, 
discussed in Section 2, a multiple regression analysis is employed to help 
capture the multiple variables involve in the study. 
In addition,  we use cross-sectional regression analysis to test empirical data, 
again in accordance with prior literature as this study is for one year; see 
Rodriguez-Fernandez (2016) and Watsham and Parramore (1997) supporting the use 
of cross-sectional data to test variables on one year.  We have used a software 
data analysis package in excel to test the data along a multivariate analysis to 
obtain descriptive statistics of the total variables, such as mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum, coefficient of variation, skewness and kurtosis. 
																																								 																				
1	Data	availability	statement:	https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/	allows	to	obtain	the	data;	in	our	case	
it	was	obtained	through	the	University	of	Leicester	Library	licence.	Pertinent	data	can	be	obtained	in	a	similar	
way	by	anyone	concerned.	
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Next, we use the correlation method to estimate the relationship between 
independent, dependent, and control variables.  Multiple linear regressions are 
“finally” employed to test corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ financial 
performance.      
 
3.2. Research and Sampling Design   
The study uses the cross-sectional data method to test a sample of firms listed 
on London Stock Exchange for the year 2014 (LSE, 2014).  The study is 
restricted to listed firms because they are expected to adhere to set regulation 
standards. In addition, listed firms are likely to prepare their accounting figures 
in compliance with international accounting practice (Ehikioya, 2009).  We 
stress that we excluded financial institutions because they are subjects to 
different regulations from non-financial firms, whence may lead to outliers 
(Ausloos et al., 2018).  In fact, mentioned scholars in prior reports have done 
likewise (Gust, 2009; Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2016). We have not taken into account 
the possibility of cross share holding (Rotundo and D'Arcangelis, 2010; 
D’Arcangelis and Rotundo,  2015; Cerqueti et al., 2018). 
 
3.3. Hypotheses Development  
After reviewing the literature from the prior studies, five hypotheses emerge: 
H1: Companies with large insider shareholding are those with superior   
financial performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). 
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H2: Companies with large board size achieve superior financial performance 
(Anderson et al., 2004). 
 H3: Companies displaying high proportion of board independence achieve high 
financial performance (Beasley, 1996; Donaldson, 1990).  
H4: Companies with CEO duality achieve less financial performance 
(Firstenberg and Malkiel, 1994) 
H5: Most high financial performance companies are those with high frequency 
audit committee meetings (Kent and Stewart, 2008) 
 
3.4. Description of Variables and Measure Indicators 
This section covers descriptions of variables used in the study.  These include 
dependent, independent and control variable. In addition, we will indicate 
measurement and proxies use to measure variables of corporate governance 
mechanism and their relationship with financial performance; see Table I. 
Selection of variables is based on prior literature (Christensen et al., 2010; 
Ehikioya, 2009) having considered both theoretical and empirical studies 
 
3.4.1. Dependent Variables 
Researchers have used various accounting –based measurement to estimate 
financial performance of companies (Christensen et al., 2010).  These include 
sales, return on asset (ROE), earnings per share and growth.  Accounting-based 
measures represent the historical figures focusing on management’s stewardship 
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of the company. However, these figures are sometimes distorted to suit 
management and might not represent the reality (Christensen et al., 2010).  
According to Core et al. (2006) operating profit measured by ROA is a better 
measure when examining the relationship between financial performance and 
corporate governance. For example, ROA is not affected by leverage, 
extraordinary items, and other discretionary items. In addition, other researchers 
(Brown and Caylor, 2009; Muth and Donaldson, 1998) have used ROA as a 
measure of accounting.  Based on these factors and previous studies, we use 
ROA in this study.  
Secondly, the forward-looking financial market measure Tobin’s Q is used in 
this study.  This is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis established 
by Malkiel and Fama (1970) where Tobin’s Q was used to capture existing 
assets and future growth potentials of the company.  Tobin’s Q also captures 
investors’ expectations to future events, including evaluation of current 
business strategies (Rose-Ackerman, 1973; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; 
Ehikioya, 2009; Christensen et al., 2010; Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2016).  Let us 
describe the dependent variables: 
(i) Return on Assets (ROA) 
The Return on Assets (ROA) gives an indication of how best the assets 
of a company is utilised to generate profit. The ROA is calculated by 
dividing annual earnings of the company by its total assets. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠×100 
(ii) Tobin’s Q 
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The Tobin’s Q is a ratio of market value of company outstanding stock 
and debt divided by replacement cost of the company’s assets (“book 
value”) (Christensen et al., 2010). 
𝑄 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  
3.4.2. Independent Variables 
The corporate governance mechanisms recalled in the empirical framework 
section are going to be the independent variables of this study.  They are: 
(i) Insider Shareholding 
The Insider shareholding refers to any director, corporate officer or 
institutional investor who owns at least 10% of the total shares of a 
corporation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Insider ownership is 
measured as the percentage of company outstanding shares owned by 
such insiders:  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ×100 
(ii) Board Size 
The Company board size refers to the number of members on the 
board.  There is some evidence to suggest that a large board size 
results in better decision making than a small board size thereby 
leading towards high financial performance (Williams et al., 2005).  𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦!𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  
(iii) Independent Board  
The Independent board refers to outside board directors who are not 
affiliated to top executives of the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
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Independent board of directors can be estimated by dividing the 
number of non-executive directors by the total number of board of 
directors (multiplied by 100):  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠×100 
(iv) CEO Duality 
The CEO duality is when the CEO also holds the position of board 
chairperson.  The role of the board of director is to monitor the CEO 
on behalf of shareholders.  Corporate governance assumes a likelihood 
of concentration of power where the CEO plays dual roles 
(Christensen et al., 2010): 
             𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝐸𝑂  
 
(v) Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit committee meetings occur when the board of directors charged 
with the responsibility of financial reporting and disclosure of 
information for the company.  It is argued by scholars that the 
frequency of audit committee meetings is strongly related to the 
performance of a company.  The logic is that regular meetings will 
mean that more information can be obtained and disclosed 
(Christensen et al., 2010).  𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
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3.4.3. Control Variables 
Researchers such as Christensen et al. (2010) and Ehikioya (2009) have used 
leverage and firm size as control variables in their study.  The probable 
relevance has also been examined by Rodriguez-Fernandez (2016), Weir et al. 
(2002) and Essen et al. (2013).  These variables are estimated through: 
(i) 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
(ii) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = !"#$% !""#$"!"#$% !!!"#!!!"#$% !"#$%& 
2.5 Regression Models  
Basing on prior studies by authors such as Guest (2009), Jackling and Johl 
(2009), Alfaraih et al. (2012), we propose two regression models to determine 
relations between good corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance of firms.  The two model equations are 
          “Model 1”: 
										𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!. 𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽!.𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽!. 𝐼𝐵 + 𝛽!.𝐶𝐷 +  𝛽!.𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽!.𝐹𝑆 + 𝛽!. 𝐿𝐺 + 𝜀! 	
          and similarly, “Model 2”:    
   Q Ratio=γ0+γ1.IS+γ2.BS+γ3.IB+γ4.CD+γ5.AC+γ6.FS+γ7.LG+ηi   
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Table I: Summary of Variable Definition and its Measurement 
Variable type 
Variable 
Name Definition and measurement 
Dependent Variables ROA 
Return on assets,  measured as net income/total 
assets × 100 
Q ratio 
Tobin’s Q, measured as Total Market Value of 
Firm/Total Assets Value 
Independent 
Variables 
IS 
Insider-shareholding, measured as the proportion 
of shares owned by insiders. 
BS 
Board-size, measured as the number of board of 
directors on company's board. 
IB 
Independent board, measured as proportion of 
independent board on company's board. 
CD 
CEO duality, measured as a Function of board 
chair person combined with CEO, CEO = 1 if 
CEO is also chairperson, otherwise = 0. 
AC 
Audit committee meetings, measured as a 
function of the number of audit committee 
meetings held.   
Control Variables 
FS 
Firm size measured as the logarithm of the firm's 
total assets. 
LG 
Leverage, measured as total assets/total 
shareholders’ equity. 
 
4. Data Analysis and Discussion  
This section contains the discussion of the empirical data 	 use in the study. A 
correlation analysis is employed to show the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and either ROA or Tobin’s Q. A regression analysis is 
presented to show how independent corporate governance mechanisms can 
either positively or negatively affect the dependent variables ROA or Tobin’s Q.  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The usual statistical characteristics, including mean, minimum, maximum, 
standard deviation, coefficient of variation (Cov.), skewness (Skew.), and 
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kurtosis (Kurt.) are reported in Table II for the dependent, independent and 
control variables for a sample of 252 firms listed on London Stock Exchange 
data, extracted from Bloomberg. 
ROA has a large standard deviation showing that the data is largely spread 
around the mean, whence the Coefficient of variation = 189%. This points to a 
high variation in the accounting-based performance among the UK’s firms.  
 
Table II: Summary of Descriptive Statistics (N=252) 
Variable Min. Max. St. Dev. Mean Cov. Skew. Kurt. 
ROA (%) -0.68 0.54 0.11 0.056 189% -1.92 18.07 
Q Ratio 0.01 9.15 1.31 1.428 92% 2.62 9.56 
IS (%) 0.00 54.80 9.64 3.869 249% 3.61 13.44 
BS (%) 4.00 17.00 2.14 8.774 24% 0.72 0.52 
IB 0.21 0.92 0.12 0.625 20% -0.49 0.30 
CD 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.016 789% 7.79 59.21 
AC 0.00 14.00 1.78 4.504 40% 1.76 5.87 
FS 1.99 5.55 0.70 3.269 21% 0.79 0.71 
LG -33.59 46.96 4.89 2.948 166% 2.82 44.92 
 
 
For the Q ratio, the closeness of the mean and standard deviation signifies that 
the market-based performance among UK firms are closely netted. This is 
reflected in the relatively low coefficient of variation = 92%.  
With reference to the independent variables, which represent corporate 
governance mechanisms, IS mean=3.9 and St. Dev.= 9.6  showing that the data 
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is much distributed far from the mean: indeed, the Min and Max values are 0.0 
and 54.8 respectively.  This is reflected in a high coefficient of variation = 
249%.  This suggests that although some companies have about 2/3 of their 
shares held by insiders, 1/3 shares are still held by outsiders.  The mean of 
BS=8.8 with a St. Dev. =2.1; Min=4, and Max=17 show that there are many 
similarities in firm’s board size in UK.   
Concerning the independent board of directors, the minimum and maximum 
values are 0.21 and 0.92 respectively; the mean= 0.63 and the standard 
deviation = 0.13 give a coefficient of variation = 20%.  Thus, there are similar 
characteristics in the type of boards in UK firms.  Most of the companies in the 
UK have independent board of directors perhaps because of transparency need 
and accountability associated with independent boards.   
The CEO duality (CD) is characterized by a mean =0.02 and a standard 
deviation=0.13.  This shows a huge deviation in the data spread of CEO duality, 
emphasized by a high coefficient of variation = 789%.  These figures show that 
most firms in UK have separated the role of CEO and board chair person.  
The statistical results for audit committee meetings held among UK firms show 
a low standard deviation=1.80 for the mean= 4.50, giving a low coefficient of 
variation = 40%.  Notice that the (AC) data ranges from 0 (!) to a Max.= 14. 	
With reference to the control variables, the logarithm of assets has a mean = 3.3 
and a standard deviation = 0.70 giving a low coefficient of variation = 21%.  
The minimum value = 1.10 and the maximum = 5.55.  Here the data clusters 
around the mean, which implies a low size variation of such firms. The leverage 
shows a mean of 2.95 and standard deviation of 4.89 giving a coefficient of 
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variation = 166% in data spread.  The data ranges from -33.59 to 46.96.  Such a 
negative leverage implies that the cost of borrowing is greater than the return on 
investment.  Thus, variations in firms’ debt are rather consequent as confirmed 
by the 166% coefficient of variation value.			
About the skewness, apart from ROA=-1.92 and IB=-0.49 that are negatively 
skewed, the remaining variable distributions present a positive skewness, 
indicating that the tail of these is on the right.  Also in terms of kurtosis, with the 
exception of variables CD=59.21 and LG=44.92 that have heavy tail or outliers 
in the data distribution, the remaining variables have light tails or few outliers. 
These features point to an “interesting” random selection.  
	
4.2. Correlation between variables 
This section on correlations will help to determine whether there is 
multicollinearity among any of the variables. We noticed that prior researchers 
have raised concerns of possible multicollinearity among variables which could 
thereby distort the estimates of the regression results.  In addition, because this 
research considers data for only one year period, there is no heteroscedasticity 
problem (Alin, 2010; Koop, 2008; Gujarity and Porter, 2009). 	
Table III displays the correlations between the dependent variable ROA and the 
independent variables and control variables, while their correlations with 
Tobin’s Q are shown in Table IV.  
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Table III.  Correlation between ROA and Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Variable ROA 
               
IS     BS   IB CD AC FS LG 
ROA 1.00 
      
  
IS 0.07 1.00 
     
  
BS 0.02 -0.03 1.00 
    
  
IB 0.01 -0.21 0.16 1.00 
   
  
CD 0.06 0.18 0.00 -0.05 1.00 
  
  
AC -0.16 -0.05 0.32 0.21 0.00 1.00 
 
  
FS -0.18 -0.23 0.60 0.44 0.00 0.41 1.00   
LG 0.15 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.10 1.00 
	
	
According to Gujarity and Porter (2009), a correlation above 0.8 signals a 
possible evidence of multicollinearity in the data set. The results in Table III 
indicate that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem here. Nevertheless, 
there are mixed results: several variables are negatively correlated to ROA, whereas 
others have positive correlation with ROA.  “Interestingly”, the correlation is negative for 
FS=-0.18 and AC=-0.16.  All other variables have positive correlation with ROA: IS=0.07, 
BS=0.02, IB=0.01, CD=0.06 and LG=0.15.  This suggests that an increase in any of these 
variables increase with ROA, whereas variables FS and AC decrease with ROA. 
Concerning Tobin’s Q and corporate governance mechanisms (Table IV), again, 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem as none of the variables has a correlation above 
0.8.  Furthermore, only variables, IS and CD have a positive correlation with Tobin’s Q (0.20, 
0.01) respectively, suggesting that when these corporate governance variables increase, 
Tobin’s Q increases also.  The variables BS (0.05), IB (-0.19), AC (-0.16), FS (-0.42), and LG 
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(-0.09) have a negative correlation with Tobin’s Q, suggesting that these variables decrease 
with Tobin’s Q.    
 
Table IV.  Correlation between Q ratio and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Variable 
    Q 
ratio          IS     BS  IB CD AC FS LG 
Q ratio 1.00 
      
  
IS 0.20 1.00 
     
  
BS -0.05 -0.03 1.00 
    
  
IB -0.19 -0.21 0.16 1.00 
   
  
CD 0.01 0.18 0.00 -0.05 1.00 
  
  
AC -0.16 -0.05 0.32 0.21 0.00 1.00 
 
  
FS -0.42 -0.23 0.60 0.44 0.00 0.41 1.00   
LG -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.10 1.00 
 
 
4.3. Regression Analysis 
In this section, the multiple linear regressions models, see Sect. 2.5, are used in 
order to establish the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the two 
response variables, ROA and Tobin’s Q. The statistical results are given in 
Table V and Table VI respectively.  
Table V points to mixed results between variables and their impacts on financial 
performance.  A few predictor variables are statistically significant, while 
others are not.  For instance, p values for IS (0.81) and CD (0.31) are high, 
considering a significant level of 0.00.  This implies that the above-mentioned variables are 
30	
	
not statistically significant and do not have predictive power on ROA. Therefore, changes in 
IS and CD will not have any impact on the financial performance of firms  when measured 
through ROA.   
However, variables BS (0.00), IB (0.03), AC (0.04), FS (0.00), and LG (0.00) have low p-
values, which imply a predictive power on the ROA.  As such, the regression Model 1 could 
be reduced to  
  ROA=0.012 𝐵𝑆 + 0.127 𝐼𝐵 − 0.008 𝐴𝐶 − 0.008 𝐹𝑆 + 0.004 𝐿𝐺 +  𝜀! 
It should be noted that the intercept value β0= 0, because of an insignificant p-
value, means that the intercept is not significantly different from 0.  Practically, 
from the reduced Model 1 equation, a prediction can be made that, for any 
additional change in BS, one can expect ROA to increase on average by 12%.  
However, additional change in AC, will result that ROA on average would 
decrease by -0.8 %, because of the negative coefficient. 
In addition, R2=0.12, see Table V, implies that only 12% of all the independent 
and control variables explain the effects on the dependent variable ROA,  
whence 88% of ROA behaviour has to be explained by other independent 
variables not included in this study. 
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Table V: Multivariate Regression Results for ROA  
Multiple Regression Results for ROA 
Variable Coefficients (x 100) t -test p-value 
Intercept 6.6332 1.6208 0.11 
IS 0.0172 0.2451 0.81 
BS 1.2385 3.2405 0.00 
IB 12.678 2.1858 0.03 
CD 5.3167 1.0269 0.31 
AC -0.8376 -2.1209 0.04 
FS -5.3093 -3.9690 0.00 
LG 0.3918 2.9896 0.00 
Regression Statistics 
R 2   0.120 
Observations   252 
Significant level: 0.000 
 
From Table VI, p-values for IS (0.15), IB (0.42), CD, AC (0.68), and LG (0.53) 
are found to be high, which implies a lack of predictive power on Tobin’s Q; 
these variables could be removed from Model 2.  In contrast, two independent 
variables BS (0.00) and FS (0.00) are statistically significant and do have 
predictive power on Tobin’s Q since they have p-values close to 0.  The new 
equation for a reduced Model 2 can be rewritten as follows:  
𝑄 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 3.18+ 0.19 𝐵𝑆 − 1.13 𝐹𝑆 + 𝜂! 	
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Table VI: Multivariate Regression Results Summary for Q Ratio 
Multiple Regression Results of Q ratio 
Variable Coefficients t –test p-value 
Intercept 3.1817 6.8030 7.86 E-11 
IS 
0.0116 
1.4471 0.1492 
BS 
0.1901 
4.3535 1.97 E-05 
IB 0.5380 0.8117 0.4178 
CD -0.0555 -0.0938 0.9254 
AC -0.0186 -0.4130 0.6800 
FS -1.1288 -7.3839 2.42 E-12 
LG -0.0094 -0.6298 0.5294 
Regression Statistics 
R 2 
 
0.253 
Observations 
 
252 
Significant level: 0.000 
 
Therefore, one can make a prediction that for a unit increase in BS, holding all 
other factors constant, the Q ratio on average will increase by 19%.  However, 
all things being equal, a unit increase in FS will have a corresponding average 
decrease equal to -113 % of the Q ratio.   
An important feature should be emphasized: the independent variable IS is not 
significant in either models.  This means that insider shareholding does not 
influence financial performance (measured through ROA and Tobin’s Q).  This 
confirms the findings of Agrawal and Knoboer (1996).  However, this finding 
disagrees with Jensen and Meckling (1976).  Therefore, our first hypothesis that 
companies with a large insider shareholding are those with superior financial 
performance can be rejected.	 
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A contrario, BS is statistically significant in both models, implying that a large 
board size could improve financial performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q).  This 
finding is consistent with Anderson et al. (2004). Therefore, our second 
hypothesis is acceptable. 
Concerning IB, which presents a statistically significant effect in ROA, one 
concludes that additions to the board of independent directors will improve 
financial performance.  This is consistent with Beasley (1996) and Donaldson 
(1990).  One could consider that the third hypothesis can be accepted 
concerning ROA.  However, in terms of Tobin’s Q, IB is statistically 
insignificant: the independent board of directors has no effect on financial 
performance.  One should reject the third hypothesis for Tobin’s Q.  
In terms of CD, there is a lack of statistical significance for both dependent 
variables (ROA and Tobin’s Q), suggesting that it does not matter whether there 
is a dual role or a separation of CEO and chair role: the financial performance 
remains unaffected.  This finding is inconsistent with Firstenberg and Malkiel 
(1994) who suggest that companies with CEO duality do not perform well 
financially.  Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is rejected.  
Regarding AC, a statistical significance is obtained for ROA but with a negative 
coefficient.  This suggests that increasing the frequency of audit committee 
meetings impacts negatively on the financial performance (ROA).  This finding 
disagrees with that of Kent and Stewart (2008).  However, in terms of Tobin’s Q 
no statistical significance is found, which suggests that the frequency of audit 
committee meetings lacks some predictive ability on the financial performance 
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(Tobin’s Q).  This finding is consistent with Weir et al. (2002).  Therefore, the 
fifth hypothesis is also rejected.  
5. Discussion  
The above results explain why there is a controversy in this field of study.  The 
statistics so obtained provide mixed results, depending on the Model.  There are 
corporate governance mechanisms that have no statistical significance; some 
have positive, and others have a negative statistical significance on estimating 
financial performance, we stress, using ROA or Tobin’s Q.   
The findings show that, insider shareholding has insignificant influence on both 
ROA and Tobin’s Q.  This supports the findings of Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996).  The implication is that whether managers own many or a few shares in 
a company is irrelevant for the financial performance.  This means, there should 
be no hindrance to pay executive bonuses in shares instead of salary, in order to 
increase insider shareholding.  
One field of controversy is board size and its impact on financial performance.  
The outcome of the study indicates a positive statistic significance of board size 
on the two financial performance ratios (ROA and Tobin’s Q). It is seen that 
increasing the size of the board improves financial performance contrary to the 
argument of Jensen (1993). The findings in this study, however, support the 
argument of Anderson et al. (2004) that large boards help in proper allocation of 
committee work for enhancing growth and financial performance. This argument 
supports the views of Fama and Jensen (1983) who argued that the role of the 
board involves monitoring managerial behaviour, which is likely to be more 
effective with a large board size.  In this respect, one can follow Williams et al. 
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(2005) arguing that financial markets place a high premium on large board size, 
perceived to be better resourced for monitoring and or skills transfer abilities.  
Both Donaldson (1990) and Beasley (1996) argued in favour of a high 
proportion of board independent members.  They documented that companies 
displaying high proportion of board independent directors achieve a high 
financial performance.  For instance, Donaldson (1990) stressed that those 
companies command creditability in accounting, whence investors seeing this 
have a favourable opinion.  The outcome of our study suggests that there is a 
statistical significance of an independent board on ROA, as in Donaldson (1990) 
and Beasley (1996).  However, an insignificant test result is discovered for 
board independent influence on the Q ratio, as in Fosberg (1989).  Thus, in 
terms of the Q ratio, one can suggest that companies should not be concerned by 
board characteristics, either executive or non-executive.		
We have pointed out the evidence from the regression results about the lack of 
statistical significance of CEO duality on both financial performance indicators 
(ROA and Tobin’s Q).  This finding is inconsistent with Fistenberg and Malkiel 
(1994) who documented that CEO duality has a negative impact.  From this 
finding, we consider that firms might save some money by employing one 
person as CEO and chairperson instead of two persons, - but that should be 
locally discussed. 
With reference to audit committee meetings, different results were obtained for 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. Significant results are obtained for ROA supporting the 
views of Kent and Stewart (2008) that a high frequency of audit committee 
meetings encourages high financial performance.  However, insignificant 
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statistical results are obtained for Tobin’s Q, indicating that the number of audit 
committee meetings does not matter: financial performance will remain 
unchanged.  This supports the findings of Weir et al. (2002). 
Finally, considering R-square, only 12% and 25% of the response variables 
explained ROA and Tobin’s Q variation.  Thus, several variables appear not to 
be included for explaining ROA and Tobin’s Q.  Therefore, some further 
imagination and studies are needed by researchers about this theoretical deficit. 
5. Conclusion  
5.1. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This study has examined the impact of 5 corporate governance mechanisms 
(insider shareholding, board size, independent directors, CEO duality, and audit 
committee meetings) on financial performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q), taking 
into account 2 control variables. The study covers a sample of 252 firms listed 
on London Stock Exchange in 2014.  Two theories of corporate governance, 
agency theory, and stewardship theory, form the theoretical framework. The 
outcome of the regression results displays mixed findings similar to prior 
studies (Christensen et al., 2010; Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2016). 
For instance, many prior studies suggest that the size of insider shareholding 
affects the financial performance (Jenson and Meckling, 1976: Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Gupta and Sachdeva, 2017).  However, the outcome indicates that insider 
shareholding has no influence on financial performance, itself consistent with 
findings of Agrawal and Knoeboer (1996).  
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 Some of the corporate governance mechanisms such as board size and 
independent board members exhibited predictive power on both financial 
performance indicators, ROA and Tobin’s Q.  This finding is in agreement with 
Christensen et al. (2010) further concluding that a strong independent board is 
one of the solutions to agency problem by reducing cost, thereby improving 
financial performance.  Somewhat inconclusively, the frequency of audit 
committee meetings indicates some influence on the financial performance 
indicator ROA but no influence on Tobin’s Q.  
Finally, our study about CEO duality demonstrated no influence on both ROA 
and Tobin’s Q.  This finding disagrees with the conflicting prior literatures 
having examined the variable.  The supporters of agency theory suggest a 
positive outcome when the role of the CEO and the chairperson is separated 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Balatbat et al, 2004).  On the other hand, supporters 
of stewardship theory argue for role of the CEO and the chairperson to be 
combined as it allows clear leadership direction that improves performance 
(Stoeberl and Sherony, 1985). However, our finding demonstrates a neutral  
cause; it does not matter whether the CEO and chairperson’s role is combined, 
or otherwise; the outcome of financial performance remains unchanged whatever 
the board choice.  
To help achieve a robust finding, the corporate governance mechanisms were 
controlled by firm size and leverage. For the firm size, the regression 
coefficients are negative, but have opposite values as concerns the leverage. 
Notice that we have not taken into account the possibility of cross share holding 
even though some thought should be given on the matter (Rotundo and 
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D'Arcangelis, 2010; D’Arcangelis and Rotundo,  2015; Cerqueti et al., 2018), 
investigating “cross performances”. 
Thus, our study, like previous studies, provides mixed findings and partial 
conclusions to the debate.  However, it has strengthened some of the existing 
theoretical framework.  We can conclude that companies in the United Kingdom 
can improve their financial market performance by adopting the right corporate 
governance mechanisms.  We have indicated which (among others) corporate 
governance mechanisms influence financial performance indeed.  
Thus, future researchers could explore other theories like stakeholder theory, 
shareholder theory, leadership cycle theory and others in order to introduce 
other variables in the considerations, such as board diligence or CEO tenure. In 
addition, other factors such as technology, global financial crises, economic 
conditions (booms and recessions), cross share holdings, … can be investigated, 
as they might likely have some impact on financial performance.  Furthermore, 
panel data can be employed to test variables over several years with other data 
sizes.   Brexit influence will likely attract new considerations. 
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